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FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS

FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: PART II*
Evsey S. Rashbat
(The first part of this article dealt with the international implications of foreign
exchange regulations, the test of public policy, the confusion in international jurisprudence and the causes of that confusion. In the present install:ment there will be
discussed the application of the test of public policy to foreign exchange restrictions,
the impediments involved, and the American and other approaches to the problem.)

VI
APPLICATION OF THE TEST OF PUBLIC POLICY TO FOREIGN
EXCHANGE REGULATIONS

A. "Political Laws''
ttpOLITICAL LAWS" have been the subject of a much disputed
doctrine. It has been stated by Dicey, and by other authoritative
writers in various countries, ~hat a court has no jurisdiction to entertain
an action for the enforcement of a "political law" of a foreign state.165
The term "political law" is not limited to the field of public law.
It is, of course, only exceptionally that rules governing the relations
between a state and its citizens are given extraterritorial e:ffect. The
doctrine goes further. It holds that rules which are technically a part
of private law, but_ which are designed to supplement the commands
and prohibitions of public law, be regarded as "political" and treated
on the same basis as public law.166
Among the classical cases to be mentioned in this connection were
those arising from the French Association Laws of July 1, 1901,
which provided for the liquidation of religious orders. The trademark Chartreuse, denoting a world famous liqueur traditionally made
by the Carthusian monks in their monastery in France, was transferred,
:!<The first part of this article was published in the April issue.
Degree in Mathematics, University of Kiev, Russia; Doctor rerum politicarum,
Berlin, Germany; Juristische Staatspruefung, Berlin, Germany; Licence en Droit,
Paris, France. At present Research Assistant, Institute of International Affairs, Columbia University.-Ed.
165 D1cEY, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 4th ed., 224 (1927). Cf. supra, 41 M1cH. L.
REv. 792 ff. (April).
166 "Exceptional legislation affecting public law never has extraterritorial effect."
Niboyet, "De l'Effet, en Pays Neutre, des Mesures de Guerre," 16 REv. DROIT INT.
PRIVE 248 at 256 (1920). La Nationale v. Biermann, (Swiss Fed. Ct., Apr. 17, 1916)
R. 0. 42.II.179, 44 CLUNET 306 (1917).
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without their consent, to a new owner. The monks, resettled in Spain,
disputed the new owner's right to the trade-mark. In litigation which
ensued in many countries and which ended, in most instances, in favor
of the monks, the political character of the French law played a large
part_.161
Some writers speak of laws inspired by "political motives"; 168
others of laws which make exceptions to the ordinary principles and
rules with a view to favoring a state: a party, a class or even particular
~eeds or ideas.169 Still others have suggested the concept of "bellicose
laws" (lois belliqueuses ), that is to say, laws which are enacted as
weapons in the struggle for power in domestic or international politics.110 Whatever particular definition is adopted, the term "political
laws" is used to refer to enactments which do not have for their object
the equitable adjustment of private relationships but which are designed to further particular governmental interests. Stich laws are,
therefore, outside the limits within which a state may expect its enactments to be enforced abroad on the principle of comity.111
Some courts have,. under the- doctrine of "political laws," disregarded the foreign exchange restrictions of other countries without
enquiring whether or not, or to what extent, the particular restrictions
may be at variance with the public policy of the forum. The Cour
d'Appel of Paris, for example, referring to foreign exchange restric'

167 See Pillet, "La Marque des Chartreux et les Pretentions du Liquidateur,"
3 REV. DROIT INT. PRIVE 525 (1907) ("The question is whether a claim to property
based on the French law of 1901 can be asserted in a foreign country"), and his
comment on Argentinian, Swiss, Dutch, German, American and English decisions in
SIREY 1908.IV.9.
168 Pillet, supra, 3 REv. DRoIT INT. PRIVE at 530.
169 Arminjon, "Les Lois Politiques et le Droit International Prive," 25 REV.
CRITIQUE 385 at 389 (1930).
170 Niboyet, "De l'Effet, en Pays Neutre, des Mesures de Guerre," 16 REV,
DRoIT INT. PRIVE 248 at 253 (1920).
171 Additional examples may be cited. "Both the Trading with the Enemy Act
and the restrictions of transfers ar<o wholly political acts having no extraterritorial
operation." Jansen, van den Oever & Cie. v. Maiani, (Trib. Civ. Zurich, Apr. 23,
1937) 1938 BLAETTER FUER ZuERCHERISCHE REcHTSPRECHUNG 225, 4 Nouv.
REV. 627 at 633 (1937). "Stamp acts of foreign countries are disregarded in respect
of negotiable instruments." DrcEY, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 4th ed., 29, note i (1927).
"This measure [ an act which, for dynastic reasons, deprived the Duke of Brunswick
of his property and_some of his civil rights], in view of its form, the authority by
which it is issued, the person to which it applies, the attending circumstances, and the
motives on which it is based, is essentially a political act." Cambridge v. Brunswick,
(Cour d'App. Paris, Jan. 16, 1836) SIREY 1836.II. 70 at 78.
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tions which had been enacted by Russia in I 9 I 7, while that country
was an ally of France, said 112 "these laws ... constitute regulations of
an exclusively political import ... whose application can consequently
be territorial only, and ... since they have no other object than to
protect the foreign [i.e. Russian] currency, they are without effect in
a French court even in disputes between nationals of Russia." Again,
the C our d' Appel of Colmar, speaking of the German foreign exchange
laws, emphasized that their "fiscal, monetary, and political character
is beyond doubt" and stated that "laws of that kind cannot be applied
in France." 173 In other countries, too, foreign exchange restrictions,
particularly those of Germany, have been denied enforcement by the
courts simply on the ground of their character as "public law," "political law," or "administrative" or "procedural" rules.174
The concept of political laws is somewhat vague. It is difficult to
cir:cumscribe it with precision. In the case of many important statutes,
political motivation has not in itself impaired their extraterritorial
recognition.175 It should be added that the doctrine of political laws,
although it is upheld by some authorities, is rejected by others.176
For the purpose of this paper it is not necessary to inquire whether
the concept of political laws may be applied to laws which do not
appear obnoxious to the public policy of the forum. 111 It will suffice to
172
Bronstein v. Banque Russo-Asiatique, (Cour d'App. Paris, June 30, 1933) 60
CLUNET 963 at 968 (1933). See first installment, p. 778.
173
Hubert-Voglet v. Schencker & Cie., (Cour d'App. Colmar, Mar. 11, 1938)
19 REVUE JuRIDIQUE D'ALSACE ET DE LoRRAINE 511 (1939), 5 Nouv. REv. 599
(1938), 34 REv. CRITIQUE 126 (1939).
174
Nathan lnstitut v. Schweizerische Bank fuer Kapitalanlagen, (Swiss Fed Ct.,
Sept. 18, 1934) R. 0. 60.II.294 at 312; (Austria Sup. Ct., Nov. 26, 1935) 63
CLUNET 442 (1936) and note by Kossler, id. 717; (Mun. Ct. Oslo, Feb. 13, 1936)
SJOEFARTSTITENDE, Feb. 19, 1936; Cook, "'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," 42 YALE L. J. 333 (1933); Cheatham, "Internal Law Distinctions in
the Conflict of Laws," 21 CoRN. L. Q. 570 at 577 ( 193 6) ; Dietrich, in 8 7
DEUTSCHE Jumz 783 (1935) and in 34 BANKARCHIV 516 (1935).
175
Consider, for example, the provisions of the Code Napoleon designed to bring
about wider distribution of holdings of real property or any statutes of a more revolutionary character which have been enacted in various countries.
176
Arminjon, "La Notion des Droits Acquis en Droit International Prive,"
44 REcUEIL CouRs 1933.II.I at 96; I ARMINJON, PRECis DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL,
2d ed., 271 (1927); Staal (comment) in 31 REv. CRITIQUE 748 (1936); 4 NEUMEYER, INTERNATIONALES VERWALTUNGSRECHT 243 (1936); Mezger, "Les Mesures
du Controle des Changes et les Principes du Conflit de Lois," 4 Nouv. REv. 527 at
545 (1937).
177
See CoNFLICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT, § 610 (1934), and, for the notion of
so-called territorial laws, Arminjon, supra, 44 RECUEIL CouRs 1933.II.1 at 84 et seq.
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suggest two lines of reasoning concerning certain foreign exchange
restrictions which, because of their political character, conflict with the
public policy of other countries.
One line of reasoning would proceed from the fact that foreign
exchange restrictions are frequently disclosed to be egoistic laws designed to advance a country's economic interest unilaterally and recklessly at the expense of other countries. The sense of justice of rightminded persons does not permit support to be given to forcible measures thus taken by a foreign country for its enrichment. Moreover,
economic self-defense affords in itself a valid ground, though it has
scarcely been recognized as such, for the application of the doctrine of
public policy.178
The second line of reasoning emphasizes that feature of the foreign exchange regulations of most countries which makes the validity
of business transactions depend on permits issued by administrative
authorities. The doctrine of political laws should, it is submitted, be
given broader scope, so that a court, in examining the foreign exchange
regulations of another country, may include in its examination, and may
appraise from the viewpoint of public policy the rules and practices
governing the issuance and denial of permits.
That such rules and practices may be crucial is apparent from the
German system,179 which was examined for the purpose of illustration,
in the first part of this article.
The German Richtlinien require in unequivocal terms that, in the
interpretation and application of the regulations, the necessities of the
state must, "in the order of their urgency," be given unconditional
178 The first clear presentation of this view is contained in a notable decision of
the Swiss Federal Court, Feb. 1, 1938, Allgemeine Elektrizitaets Gesellschaft and Siemens & Halske v. Journaliag A. G. (Swiss Osram case), 39 BULL. INST. JuR. 111
(1938). Cf. (Swiss Fed. Ct., Oct. 8, 1935) R. 0. 61 .II.242 (at 4); (Ct. Amsterdam,
Mar. 22, 1935) 1935 NEDERLANDSCHE JURISPRUDENCE 590, and (Ct. Amsterdam,
June 23, 1939) 32 REv. CRITIQUE 474 (1937). Recognition of foreign laws which
are prejudicial to the rights of the nation or its s;itizens would "annihilate the
sovereignty and equality of every .nation which should be called upon to recognize and
enforce them; or compel it to desert its own proper interest and duty to its own subjects in favor of strangers, who were regardless of .both." STORY, CoNFLICT OF LAws,
7th. ed.,§ 32'(1872). "American courts cannot be indifferent when protection for a
foreign economy is thus sought at the expense of American creditors." 47 YALE L. J.
451 at 459 (1938). Cf. Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. I at 6 (1816).
179 Some German enactments are by their own terms described as "political,"
e. g., measures taken in occupied Austria "for the prevention of the political flight
of capital." DEUTSCHER REICHSANZEIGER, March 15, 1938, No. 62.
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priority even over established rights of the parties. This principle is
stressed and elaborated at various points in the Richtlinien. 180
Decisions of the foreign exchange offices are not subject to review
by the courts.181 Otherwise, according to the German view, inconveniences would arise, the courts being bound by norms of a generally
obligatory character, particularly statutes, whereas the action of the
foreign exchange offices is often based on unpublished orders which
remain unknown to the courts. The administrative decisions depend
on "peculiar considerations of expediency, regard for commercial policy
and the like." 182
How the regulations are administered becomes still clearer from
the German reports and legal literature.
Thus, the question has been discussed whether licenses should be
granted for the payment of judgments for damages recovered against
Germans by foreigners. 188 The position was taken by some that, where
the German was unquestionably liable under private law, it seemed
"expedient" to approve such payments "if payments may be expected
to flow in "the opposite direction." These writers also pointed out the
consequences of having the law of performance of contracts subjected
to "arbitrary conditions." The prevailing opinion, however, seems to
be that the German balance of payment "must not be burdened with
remittances for which there is no immediate counter-performance." 184
German importers frequently were unable to obtain permits to pay
for goods already ordered abroad. In such cases the seller in the
foreign country, after selling the goods for the German importer's
account, often brought action there or availed himself of an arbitration
clause in the contract to recover the difference between the amount
thus realized and the contract price; generally, he could show that the
German importer had assumed the risk of procuring the required
permit. When it came to enforcing in Germany a judgment or arbitration award which had been thus o?tained abroad, the principle that
180

See Richtlinien, I, 3, RGBI.1938.I.1855.
HARTENSTEIN, DEVISENNOTRECHT 302 ff., § 39, note 9 (1935).
182
1938 DEv. ARCH. 351.
188
According to an unpublished order of Jan. 16, 1935, permits for the paymenJ;
of damages to foreigners are never to be granted if the damage was caused by some
measure taken by the exchange authorities. See also 1937 DEv. ARCH. 1503. "No
wrong is done to the foreign creditors. The foreign countries have been <1dvised
often enough of the principle of the 'New Plan' that payment by a German can safely
be counted on only when a license has been granted." RE 29/37 D. St.
184
Thode, "Schiedsverfahren und Devisenrecht," 1938 DEV. ARCH. 289; FLAD,
BERGHOLD UND FABRrcrus, DAs NEUE DEvrsENRECHT, A 78, § 40, note I (1939).
181
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duly rendered foreign judgments and awards should be recognized
came into conflict with the governmental policy underlying the management of foreign exchange. The latter was held paramount. Permits which were necessary for the enforcem~nt of the -foreign decisions
were denied on the ground that, since the decision ignored the German
foreign exchange regulations, it could not be giv~n effect in Germany.185 •
There was no suggestion that this made for a better administration
of justice; individual rights were deliberately subordinated to what
were conceived to be the superior rights and interests of the Reich.186
·
Outside of Germany decisions can already be found seeking a way
to meet these new phenomena which have arisen in the application of
foreign exchange restrictions. The Supreme Court of New York, in
Loeb v. Bank of Manhattan Company,181 held that "A capricious or
fanciful refusal [ to grant a permit] is entitled to no. recognition in a
forum administering justice." The Gerechtshof of Amsterdam, in a
judgment which was affirmed May 26, 1939, by the Hooge Raad of
the Netherlands, observed that the German foreign exchange restrictions "are frequently applied by the German authorities in a manner''
which makes them appear ''to be inconsistent with the Dutch concept
185 Thode, "Schiedsverfahren und Devisenrecht," 1938 DEv. ARCH. 289 at 349;
(Landgericht Dortmund, Jan. 8, 1936), 65 JuR. WocH. 1550 (1936); (Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, Nov, 25, 1936), 66 JuR. WocH. 1251 (1937) and comment by
Berghold, id. 1252. In (Oberlandesgericht Celle, Apr. 24, 1937) 66 JUR. WocH,
2834 (1937), relied on by NussBAUM, MoNEY IN THE LAW 493, note 29 (1939), a
permit had been granted only for a partial payment into an account of the Deutsche
Verrechnungskasse because of a particular cleai:;ing agreement with the Netherlands.
186 The maxim, "Law can be only what is to the advantage, npt to the disadvantage, of the German people," is already to be found in German decisions, e.g., (Landgericht Schneidemuehl, Jan. 14, 1939) 68 JuR. WocH. 420 (1939).
187 18 N.Y.S. (2d) 497 at 499 (Sup. Ct. 1939). Cf. also Branderbit v. Hamburg-American Line, 29 N.Y.S. (2d) 488 (Mun. Ct. 1941), revd. 31 N.Y.S. (2d)
588 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Werfel v. Boehmische Escomptebank und Creditanstalt, (App.
Div.) N.Y.L.J., July 20, 1939, p. 161, where Carew, J., sought in vain for a satisfactory solution. " .•• laws and regulations [ of another country] may be unjust,
partial to citizens, and against foreigners; ..• they may be, and the decisions of courts
founded on them, just cause of complaint against the supreme power of the State
where rendered. To adopt them [foreign judgments' or decrees] is not merely saying
that the courts have decided correctly on the law, but it is approbating the law itself."
Smith, C. J., in Bryant v. Ela, Smith (N. H.) 396 at 404 (1815). "If a civilized
nation seeks to have the sentences of its own courts held of any validity elsewhere,
they ought to have a just regard to the rights and usages of other civilized nations,
and the principles of public and national law in the administration of justice." Story,
J.~ in Bradstreet v. Neptune Insurance Co., (C. C. Mass. 1839) 3 F. Cas. No. 1,793,
p. II84 at 1187:2.
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of public policy." 188 The Gourd' Appel of Paris, in a case which arose
from the denial of a permit, declared that the denial was "contrary to
French public policy" and that "the fact that a debtor could not obtain
a permit from the German authorities to pay his debts in France cannot be considered." 189
The law of conflicts is based on the conviction that it is in the general interest for one state to co-operate with another in the field of
private law. There is, however, no reason why a court should, contrary to the principles which are cherished in its jurisdiction, permit
the rights of the parties, due process, and justice itself to be sacrificed
to the transient political aims of a foreign nation.

B. Retroactive L~ws
A law which disregards the rule pacta sunt servanda and "takes
away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing law" 190 is termed
retroactive or retrospective.
Ordinarily laws are not retroactive.191 Vested rights are, by their
very defoµtion, rights which new laws will respect. Regard for vested
rights is founded on a twofold basis. First, it would outrage the sense
of justice to deprive a person of rights which he has acquired at the
cost of goods or effort. Second, no kind of social order would be
possible if establish,d relationships could at any moment be disregarded or overthrown.192
The rule against retroactive legislation is a basic principle of jurisprudence which is embodied in the constitutions of many countries.198
It is "declaratory of the common sense and reason of the most civilized
188

Appeldoorn v. Osram (Dutch Osram case), (Gerechtshof Amsterdam, June

30, 1938; Hooge Raad of the Netherlands, May 26, 1939) 41 BULL, INST. JuR. 291,
90 ( 1939).
189 Societe C. B. Boehringer Sohn v. Logerlotz, (Cour d'App. Paris, July 20,
1939) 41 BULL. INsT. JuR. 269 (1939), 37 REVUE DE ScrnNcE ET DE LEGISLATION
FINANCIERES 608 (1939).
190

Story, J., in Society for Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler,

2

Gall. C. C.

105, 22 F. Cas. 756 at 767 (1814).
191

Roubier, "Les Confl.its de Lois dans le Temps en Droit International Prive,"

26 REv'. DRoIT INT. PRIVE 38 ( l 93 l); Roubier, "De l'Effet des Lois Nouvelles sur
les Contrats en Cours," 52 REv. CRITIQUE DE LEGISLATION ET DE JurusPRUDENCE

120 (1932).
192

Ripert, "Les Regles du Droit Civil Applicables aux Rapports Internationaux,"

44 RECUEIL CouRs. 1933.II.569 at 634.
l9a. Smead, "The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of
Jurisprudence," 20 MINN. L. REv. 775 (1936).
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states, ancient and modern." 19¾ The rule is internationally recognized.
As the Permanent Court of International Justice has repeatedly
stress_ed, it is part of the "international common law." 195
Courts which apply this rule to laws of their own country may with
at least equal propriety apply it to laws of another country. "Effect will
not be given by the courts of a state to foreign laws in derogation of the
contracts ... of citizens." 100 In dealing with foreign exchange restrictions, as well as in other connections, courts thus have frequently held
with respect to a foreign legislative, administrative or judicial act that
its enforcement would be against public policy because it violated vested
rights.197
In recent years, however, the reasoning on this subject has become
somewh~t confused and the decisions inconsistent.
The rule against retroactive legislation has never been one which
demanded unqualified observance. It has been universally recognized
that there may be laws which, though impairing vested rights, operate
for the benefit of the community, and that it is, therefore, not feasible
to exclude retroactive laws altogether.198 Vested rights, moreover, are
subject to regulation in the public interest, and it is not always easy
to determine in what cases they are unduly infringed or disturbed by
such regulation.
In the economic and financial field, retroactive laws and regulations
have in recent years increased tremendously in importance. Various
countries have had to resort to them, though in far different degrees.
There have been currency devaluations, invalidation of contractual gold
clauses, other interferences with the rights of creditors and, above all,
Kent, J., in Dash v. Van Kleeck; 7 Johns. Ch. 477 at 507 (N. Y. 18n).
Judgment No. 7, May.25, 1926, (P. C. I. J., Ser. A., No. 7) Case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1 HuosoN, WoR.LD CouRT
REPORTS 510 (1934).
196 Dyke v. Erie Ry., 45 N. Y. II3 at II8 (1871).
197 "The application [ of the German rules] would have the result that, to the
prejudice of the basic principle underlying Dutch .law and deeply rooted in Art. 1374
of the Dutch Civil Code, a promise binding according to Dutch I:.aw would be annulled
or impaired by a foreign sovereign. This is a result not to be tolerated by Dutch public
policy." Dutch Osram case, 41 BULL. INST. JuR. 90 at 94 (1939). Cf. also the
cases concerning revaluation of debts paid off in depreciated currency, (Sup. Ct. Norway, Feb. 2, 1934) 1934 NoRsK RETSTITENDE 152 (citing § 97 of the Norwegian
Constitution), Batiffol in 34 REv. CRITIQUE 127 (1939) commenting on Staedtische
Sparkasse v. Werner, (French Cass. Civ., Oct. 19, 1938) and cases cited by NUSSBAUM,
MoNEY IN THE LAW 295, note 56 (1939).
198 Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209 (1822); Boston•& Gunby v. Cummins,
16 Ga. 102 (1854).
19 ¾
195
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various measures for· the control of foreign exchange with which we
are here particularly concerned.
This tendency to relax the rule against domestic retroactive legislation has been reflected also in the attitude of. the courts towards
foreign legislation.
An American judge who in an earlier day might have refused to
enforce a retroactive foreign law has remarked, by way of dictum, that
"what we deem right for the preservation of our financial structure
cannot be wrong when employed by others." 199 A French court suggested that, since deviations from the great principles of the law have
occurred in all countries in consequence of the universal economic
crisis, one would not be on firm ground who urged the objection of
public policy against a deviation of this kind by a foreign law. 200 The
Gour de Bruxelles, in holding that application of the American Joint
Resolution of June 5, 1933, to bonds issued by the City of Antwerp
could not be deemed violative of the Belgian concept of public policy,
said: 201
". . . the numerous rules of analogous import issued in this
country since the outbreak of the war forbid the Belgian courts
from holding that the prohibition of gold clauses or gold value
clauses, or the retroactive invalidation, entirely or in part, of stipulations lawfully entered into, is actually inconsistent with that concept." 202
What are the merits of this argument?
Legislatures, even though they may digress from the rule against
retroactive laws, never repudiate this rule, which, as Justice Story has
observed, stands upon "the fundamental laws of every free government," upon "the principles of natural justice," and upon "the deci199 MacCrate, J., in Goodman v. Deutsch-Atlantische Telegraphen Gesellschaft,
166 Misc. 509 at 510, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 80 (1938), quoted supra at note 37.
200 Galatti v. Banque des Pays de !'Europe Centrale, (Trib. Com. Seine, July 26,
1934) D. P. 1935.II.12 (concerned with Austrian emergency statutes).
201 Ville d'Anvers v. La Belgique lndustrielle, (Cour d'App. Brussels, Feb. 4,
1936) PASICRISIE BELGE 1936.2.52 at 56:2, SIREY 1937. IV.1, 3 Nouv. REv. 158
(1936), affd. by the Belgian Cour Cass., Feb. 24, 1938, 39 BULL. INsT. JUR. 105
(1938). Cf. regarding the same loan (Trib. Civ. Antwerp, Jan. 5, 1935) 32 BuLL.
INsT. JuR. 93 (1935).
202 See also SACK und MEYER, GoLD UND VALUTAKLAUSEL IN DEUTSCHER UND
NrnnERLAENDISCHER GERICHTSPRAXIs 294 (1937); (Sup. Ct. Austria, Sept. 5, 1934)
1934 RECHTSPRECHUNG, HERAUSG. VOM VERBAND OESTERREICHISCHER BANKEN UND
BANKIERs, No. 300, p. 178.
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sions of most respectable judicial tribunals." 203 The Reichsgericht, at
the very time when the retroactive German legislation on exchange
control was in full swing, again proclaimed: 204
"The debtor's fidelity to his promise is the fundamental basis
of all commerce; not only is the present German law of contracts
based on it, but it is likewise demanded by the sound ideas of the
German people; consequently its extinction in relations between
Germans for reasons not resulting from the position of the parties
or the superior interests of the nation would be peculiarly subversive of the security and continuity of German economic life."
When the German or sonie other legislature impairs vested rights
or permits the nonperformance of lawful ·contracts, it invokes' a real
or pretended national exigency in justification of its disregard of long
established principles. "Any private right, no matter to whom it
belongs, be it personal or in rem, must in any nation yield to the
necessities of that nation," asserts Dietrich, a German advocate of the
international recognition of the German foreign exchange legislation.205
"Whether or not the right is thereby stripped of its value," he adds,
"cannot be decisive, since above the sphere of the individual is the
welfare of the entire nation."
If a legislature thus feels warranted in subordinating basic principles of justice to the supe~ior interests of its nation, it does not follow
that courts of other countries must recognize or give effect to its enactments.
There is no rule of conflict of laws which prescribes that a court
must refrain from scrutinizing the reasons which prompted foreign
legislation. In respect of the necessary balancing of social values there
exists nothing analogous to the doctrine of renvoi which would require
resort to foreign judges; and the considerations which led a government to enact legislation have no claim to being recognized as valid
beyond its borders. Justice and expediency may on occasion require
that a foreign retroactive law be given effect. 200 But it will not suffice
Story, J., in Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch (13 U.S.) 43 at 52 (1815).
Kreissparkasse Aaachen v. Deutscher Sparkassen und Giroverband, (ReichsgericlJ.t, May 28, 1936) 65 JuR. WocH. 2058 (1936), 3 Nouv. REv. 353 at 361
(1936). ·
205 Dietrich, "Zur Geltung Nationalen Rechts im Internationalen Rechtsverkehr,"
67 JuR. WocH. 2606 at 2607:2 (1938). Cf. Dietrich, "Die Internationalrechtliche
Bedeutung des Devisenrechts," 64 JuR. WocH. 3013 (1935).
206 But even here it depended on the circumstances on which the retroactive law
had been enacted and the manner in which it had been framed. Cf. the cases cited
203

204
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for this purpose that, in view of the special conditions prevailing in the
foreign country, its extraordinary law did not in itself arouse adverse
criticism. Extraordinary reasons and extraordinary measures do not
have the same weight within and without a country. Reasons which
within the country may appear sufficient or even imperative may, because of their local character, be wholly inadequate to prompt the
courts of another country to abandon fundamental and traditional
principles of their own.2-0 1
The rule against enforcing retroactive measures should, therefore,
in the absence of special and affirmative reasons to the contrary, prevail
with respect to legislation of another country, even though the country
of the forum may itself be occasionally compelled to resort to such
measures. And, in so far as retroactive foreign exchange restrictions
are concerned, generally no valid reason will be found for giving them
extraterritorial e:ffect.208
supra, note 201, and the extreme views of Mestre, SIREY 1937.IV.1. at 3, and Mazeaud,
D.P.1936.Il.78 at 81; the Swiss Osram case, 39 BuLL. INST. JuR. II 1 (1938);
Vereeniging voor den Effectenhandel v. Koninklijke Nederlandsche, (Hooge Raad,.
Mar. 13, 1936) 34 BuLL. INST. JuR. 304 (1936), 31 REV. CRITIQUE 733 (1936).
1936 NEDERLANDISCHE JuRISPRUDENTIE 497; Vereeniging voor den Effectenhandel
v. De Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij, (Hooge Raad, Mar. 13, 1936) 34 BULL.
INST. JuR. 315 (1936), 1936 NEDEIU,ANDISCHE JuRISPRUDENTIE 506; Casparius,
"Ungeloeste Fragen auf dem Gebiet der Zivilrechtsfolgen der Deutschen Devisengesetzgebung," 86 JHERING's JAHRBUECHER 33 at 82 (1936).
201 Cf. De Bataafsche case, supra note 206, and the case concerned with the
dollar loan of the City of Rotterdam of 1924, Vereeniging voor den Effectenhandel
v. Fortuyn, (Gerechtshof Hague, Dec. 24, 1936) 36 BuLL. INST. JuR. 315 (1937),
affd. by the Hooge Raad of the Netherlands, Feb. II, 1938, 38 BULL. INST. JuR.
282 (1938); de la Marniere (comment) in D.P. 1935.II.12 at 14; Karl Wahle,
"Die Wirksamkeit auslaendischer Devisensperren nach Oesterreichischem Recht," 9
ZEITSCHRIFT FuER AusLAENDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PruvATRECHT (Heymann) 779 at 783 (1935) ("The fact that the country of the forum has for the
protection of its interests enacted an analogous law does not in itself require recognition
of a foreign law").
208 The author is indebted to Professor Karl N. Llewellyn for the following paragraph from the Revised Uniform Sales Act, tentative third draft as recently approved
by the subcommittee for presentation to the joint committee in charge:
"SECTION 71, SUBSTITUTED PERFORMANCE ON FAILURE OF PRESUPPOSITION,
"Between merchants ••.
"(2) If the agreed manner of payment fails because of foreign governmental
regulation, the seller may withhold [ or stop] delivery unless the buyer provides a
manner of payment which is commercially a substantial equivalent. If [the] delivery
has already been made [taken], payment in the manner provid~d by the regulation
discharges the buyer's obligation unless the regulation constitutes oppressive or predatory discrimination."
Concerning the second sentence of this paragraph (compare supra, at notes 45,
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C. Confiscatory Measures
Confiscation offers an especially flagrant example of retroactive
measures. That it is in principle inconsistent with an orderly social
system is universally recognized. It is "condemned by the enlightened
conscience and judgment of modern times" 209 and is "contrary to the
practice of civilized nations." 210
Nevertheless, confiscatory measures have frequently been adopted
in our time. Generally, however, they have been concomitant with
revolutionary upheavals. Examples are the Soviet nationalization
decrees with their far-reaching repercussions, the expropriation of oil
properties in Mexico, and the expropriation of merchant vessels and
industrial enterprises during the Spanish Civil War. The authors of
such measures have rarely claimed that they should be enforced in
other countries and, with the revolutionary movement on the wane,
the protection of property has, as a rule, been re-established.
Determination of the attitude to be taken towards foreign confiscatory measures is beset with a twofold difficulty.
In the first place, interferences of this kind not infrequently have
"actually attained such effect as to alter the rights and obligations of
parties in a manner we [the courts] may not in justice disregard." 211
46, 47, and infra at note 278) the following observations may be made.
( l) Foreign exchange restrictions are often enacted merely because governments
in need of funds are tempted to hurt foreign creditors rather than to impose new
burdens on their own people. Even if measures thus adopted fall short of being "oppressive or predatory discrimination," it seems unwarranted to require that the standard :ipplied in one country as to what is proper and fair in this field must be accepted
without question elsewhere.
( 2) Adequate information concerning exchange restrictions and the manner of
of their administration is generally extremely difficult to obtain. The burden of showing that a regulation is not infected with substantial vices such as are frequently found
should, therefore, be clearly imposed on the party who seeks the benefit of the regulation.
(3) Foreign exchange regulations, whether actually enacted or potential, have
often been used by various governments as an element of their bargaining power in the
negotiation of commercial treaties. This being the case, the question should be considered whether a provision such as the one quoted might not unduly hamper the
executive branch of the government.
209 Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. (73 U. S.) 532 at 536 (1868).
210 Even the right to seize enemy property during war is subject to limitations.
United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. (32 U. S.) 5 l at 86 (1833); Ware v. Hylton, (3
U.S.) 3 Dall. 199 at 281 (1796); Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch (12 U.S.) IIO
(1814); 2 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2d ed., 46 (1913).
211 Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N. Y. 220 at 225, 186 N. E. 679
(1933). See also Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 120 Misc. 252, 199 N. Y. S. 355
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How, for instance, are the rights to property to be ascertained if it has
changed hands since its confiscation by a foreign sovereign? The courts,
in their endeavor to work out equitable and practical solutions, have
had to take into account at one and the same time their traditional
principles and the hard facts. This has been a difficult task and it is
not surprising that the decisions in all countries have in many instances
been unsatisfactory and inconsistent in their reasoning and result.212
The second difficulty has arisen from the fact that here, as so often
in the application of a general principle, there is doubt as to where the
line is to be drawn at which a measure goes beyond what is permitted
by public policy. The taking of property for public use, with just
compensation to the owner, is permitted everywhere, as is also the
restriction of individual rights by the state for the protection of the
lives, health, morals and welfare of the public.218 The right of property has been appropriately compared with a rubber ball which, while
tending to perfect roundness, may be indented in various ways. According to some recent theories, property rights should be accorded protection only so long as they are exercised in harmony with their social
purposes.2 u
One thing, however, is certain; namely, that it is the substance of
an act and not the label given it that must be examined. That the
foreign exchange restrictions are nowhere avowedly confiscatory is not
(1922); same v. same, 269 N. Y.- 158, 145 N. E. 917 (1924), and, as instances of
continental jurisprudence, the famous cases of the Swiss Federal Court, Dec. 10, 1924,
R. 0. 50.II.507 (Hausner v. Banque Internationale de Commerce de Petrograde),
R.O.51.II.259 (Wildbuschewitsch v. Waisenamt), R.O. 54.II.225 (Tscherniak v.
Tscherniak).
212 See, e.g., Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N. Y. 149 at 163, 147
N. E. 703 (1925); Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369 at
378, 189 N. E. 456 (1934); Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 266 N. Y.
71 at 90, 193 N. E. 897 (1934); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 57 S. Ct.
758 (1937); United States v. President and Directors of Manhattan Co., 276 N. Y. 396,
12 N. E. (2d) 518 (1938); Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co.,
280 N. Y. 286, 20 N. E. (2d) 758 (1938), affd. United States v. Moscow Fire Ins. Co.,
309 U.S. 624, 60 S. Ct. 725 (1939); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 62 S. Ct.
552 (1942); U.S.S.R. v. Ropit, (French Cass. Req., March 5, 1928) S1REY 29-I.217,
D. P. 28.I.81 and note Savatier, D. P. 28.II.49 at 50; Borchard, "Confiscations,
Extraterritorial and Domestic," 31 AM. J. INT. L. 675 (1937); Habicht, "The
Application of Soviet Laws and the Exception of Public Order," 21 AM. J. INT. L.
238 (1927).
218 Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 26 S. Ct. 127 (1905).
2 14- "Civil rights are protected by law except in cases when their enforcement
would be inconsistent with their social or economic purpose." Sec. 1, Russian Civil
Code of 1922 (translated in RusslAN REVIEW, Sept. 15, 1923, p. 5).
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decisive. It is for the courts to determine, in the proper exercise of
their, judicial function and without regard for labels, whether particular measures are confiscatory in character and should consequently be
denied effect.215
From the German example it is evident that fteezing of foreignheld assets may reach a point at which a foreign creditor, though not
formally divested of his claim, cannot dispose of it, except by selling
it to the state, directly or indirectly, for a fraction of its, face amount.
Many courts, and particularly those of Switzerland, have denied recognition to restrictions of this and similar kinds on the ground that
they were "spoliative interferences with the• rights of creditors." 216
Some regulations, as we have seen, go even farther and explicitly
deprive the owners of any vestige of right to dispose of their property.
Of this character are the so-called "safeguarding injunctions" issued
by the German foreign exchange offices, which have already been
described. The Commercial Court of Brussels has declared, as have
other courts in effect, that such injunctions "which wholly deprive an
owner of his property" are tantamount to expropriation without just
compensation and are thus "obnoxious to ,Belgian public policy." 211
215 "Confiscation has no fixed and unalterable meaning." Warren, "What is Confiscation?" 140 ATLANTIC MoNTHLY 246 at 247 (1927), cited by Hale, "What is a
'Confiscatory' Rate?" 35 CoL. L. REv. 1045 (1935).
" ••• confiscation ..• must be an act done in some way on the part of the
government of the country where it takes place, and in some way beneficial to that
government; though the proceeds may not, strictly speaking, be brought into its
treasury." Ellenborough, L. J., in Levin v. Allnutt, 15 East 267 at 269, 104 ·Eng.
Rep. 845 (1812). "There can be expropriation when rights in a thing are taken,
other than the property itself, as well as when the property itself is taken with all its
attributes." (Trib. Com. Brussels, Oct. 26, 1939) 54 JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX, No.
, 3589 (1939). It is therefore impossible to concur in the view expressed in the comment in II FoRDHAM L. REv. 71 at 87 (1942) that foreign exchange laws "have
no expropriatory effect and do not deprive anyone of his ownership or right. They
restrict only certain functions and this only temporarily." Cf. Weiden, "German
Confiscations of American Securities," 17 N. Y. UNiv. L. Q. REv. 200 (1940).
216 "The effect of the Italian laws concerning foreign exchange would be to
despoil the plaintiff of its rights as a creditor arising under Dutch law; it must therefore be rejected also from the viewpoint of public order." Jansen, van den Oever &
Cie. v. Maiani, (Trib. Civ. Zurich, Apr. 23, 1937) 1938 BLAETTER FUER ZuERCHERISCHE RECHTSPRECHUNG 225, 4 Nouv. REV. 627 (1937). For other Swiss cases
see supra, notes 49 and 36, and Domke in 3 ·G1uRISPRUDENZA CoMPARATA DI DrRITTO
lNTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO 364 (1938). But cf. (Swiss Fed. Ct., Sept. 30, 1938)
1938 DEv. AR.cH. II03, 1237.
'
217 Eismann v. Melzer, (Trib. Com. Brussels, June 9, 1938) 40 BULL. INST.
JuR. 234 (1939), 54 JouRNAL DES TRIBUNAUX, No. 3558 (1939), 31 LA JURISPRUDENCE CoMMERCIALE DE BRUXELLES 412 (1938), citing Art. II of the Belgian
Constitution.
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Another example is ~:ffered by the appointment of "commissioners"
for business enterprises in Germany and the occupied territories. Such
appointments, like the 'fsafeguarding injunctions," are not designed
for the protection of either the business enterprise or its creditors, as
in the case of a bankruptcy or an equity receivership proceeding under
American law. 218 Their sole purpose is to despoil certain classes of
persons of their property. Divestment of an owner's right thus
brought about has generally been disregarded by the courts.219 The
Supreme Court of New York, in Anninger v. Hohenberg, 220 declared
that such a "liquidating process is sheer confiscation" and that to uphold
the commissioner's claim "would mean that our courts will not only
recognize but render assistance to the confiscatory, proscriptive policies
of the German Reich." The District Court of Zurich stated unequivocally 221 that the appointment of commissioners of this kind was against
Swiss public policy because it abolished the recognition of private
property.
The important German statute relating to the discharge of old
debts ( Gesetz ueber die Bereinigung alter Schulden) 222 belongs in some
respects in the same category. Prefaced, in an unusual way, by a
pathetic preamble, it provides that, in certain circumstances, if a debtor
218
But cf., e.g., the quite different character of the Dutch decree of May 24,
1940 (Staatsbl.id No. A1), as amended May 7, 1942 (Staatsblad No. C34, reprinted
N. Y. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK CIRCULAR No. 2091, C.C.H. WAR LAW SERVICE,
Foreign Supplement, 1f 67,150). This was described as "A measure of protection not
of expropriation. Its purpose is to conserve not to confiscate, to protect the rights of
individuals not to destroy them." Anderson v. N.V. Transandine Handdmaatschappij,
28 N. Y. S. (2d) 547 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Amstelbank N. V. v. Guaranty Trust Co. of
N. Y., 177 Misc. 548, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 194 (1941); Koninklijke Lederfabriek
"Oisterwijk" N. V. v. Chase National Bank, 177 Misc. 186, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 518
(1941); comment, 41 CoL. L. REv. 1072 (1941); 41 MICH. L. REv. 706 (1943).
219
Cf., e.g., with regard to the Austrian statutes and to other -similar statutes
imposed by Germany and providing for the appointment of commissioners (Kommissarische Verwalter), Thorsch v. Thorsch, (Obergericht Zurich, Mar. 1, 1939) 42 BuLL.
INST. JuR. 87 (1940) and other decisions cited in that publication: 40 id. 234, No.
10650, 251-252, No. 10701-10702a (1939); 41 id. 262-264, No. 10905-10910
(1939); 42 id. 57, No. 10954-10956 (1940) (United States, Holland, Switzerland,
Sweden, Denmark, Belgium). Only Dutch Kantongericht Hilversum, Dec. 13, 1938,
40 id. 251, No. 10701 (1939), did not regard the statute invalidated as at variance
with public policy.
2120
172 Misc. 1046 at 1047, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 499 (1939). Cf. Loeb v. Bank
of Manhattan Co., 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 497 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
221
Thorsch case, (Bezirksgericht Zurich, Dec. 7, 1938) 40 BULL. INST. JuR.
251, No. 10702a (1939), a.ffd. (Obergericht Zurich, Mar. 1, 1939) 42 id. 87 (1940).
Cf. Jellinek v. Levy, (Trib. Com. Paris, Jan. 18, 1940) GAZ. PAL. 1940.I.188.
222
Law of Aug. 17, 1938, RGBI.1938.I.1033.
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is unable to pay, the creditor must write off the debt as worthless.
According to a recital in section 1, the law was enacted principally to
assist persons who had been ruined economically "because of their
exertions for the Nazi movement." The German court is empowered
to cancel or reduce the debts and may, "so far as appears expedient,"
do this without giving the creditor a hearing. A circular letter of the
Reichs Minister of Economics 223 makes it clear that where a foreigner's
claim against a German is thus cancelled or reduced "for want of a
voluntary release" a permit, such as must ordinarily be obtained for
liquidation of a debt, is not required.224
Reference should be made also to_ the prohibitions enacted in Germany, and in many other countries as well, against re-introducing into
a state its own paper money. A forceful argument that this amounted
to confiscation was ad"\l"anced in non-German courts which were urged
to hold that despite the prohibition a tender of German banknotes was
a good tender. The value of banknotes is based solely on their function as legal tender in the ~ountry in which they were issued. If,
by fiat of the issuing state, they can no longer be lawfully brought back
into the country where alone they are legal currency, banknotes in the
hands of foreign owners must lose most of their value. The inference
is that a prohibition of this kind is confiscatory.225
The foregoing illustrations indicate the importance that may attach to the argument of confiscation in, the field of foreign exchange
restrictions.
223

Circular letter of April 4, 1939, 1939 DEv. ARCH. 755.
A circular letter of May 12, 1939, 1939 DEv. ARCH. 718, was concerned
with the fact that banks frequently hold deposits in the names of foreigners and
emigrants consisting of securities which have been made practically valueless; this
condition, according to the Reichsminister of Economics, should be "cleared up"
(bereinigt) by the banks simply adding these deposits to their own holdings.
225
"The mark note is legal tender for the payment of debts expressed in German marks; a measure adopted by the Reich depriving mark notes circulating abroad
of their character as a means of payment should not be taken into consideration by
Swiss judges." Rosmann v. Tefag, (Trib. Com. Zurich, Oct. 5, 1937) 6 Nouv. REv.
288 at 290 (1939). Cf. Kassel v. N. V. Nederlandsch Amerikaansche Stoomvaart
Maatschappij, 177 Misc. 92, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 450 (1940); Mezger, "Les Mesures
du Controle des Changes et les Principes du Conflit de Lois," 4 Nouv. REv. 527 at
539 (1937). Contra: German courts, e.g., (Oberlandesgericht Breslau, Mar. 18,
I<J37) 39 BuLL. INST. JuR. 323 (1938), 42 DAs RECHT 357 (1938). On the
present unsatisfactory state of the law, see comment, 27 CoRN. L. Q. 267 (1942).
Cf. Goldarbeiter v~ Cunard White Star, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 920 (Sup. Ct. 1941);
Branderbit v. Hamburg-American Line, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 488 ('Mun. Ct. 1941),
revd. 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 588 (Sup. Ct. 1941). Cf. also cases cited supra, notes 8, 43,
and 44, in the first installment.
224
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D. Violations of the Principle of Reasonable Classification
The principle of equality has been recognized by the courts of
various countries as another of the tests applicable to the doctrine of
public policy.
No judge is disposed to recognize or enforce laws of a foreign
country which effect discriminations to the prejudice of the nationals
of his own country.226 Foreign exchange restrictions frequently are of
this character. It is true that usually, for technical reasons, their distinctions are based on residence rather than on nationality.221 This,
however, qualifies but little the practical effect of their provisions, which
are in reality directed against foreigners. 228 The discriminatory character of the German laws is accentuated by the provisions which permit
certain categories of persons to be wholly or partially exempted from
its prohibitions and restrictions. 229 The discretion vested in the officials
in this regard is freely used by them, especially in favor of Germans
living abroad, and the German authorities themselves concede that the
public management of foreign exchange is, in its most important aspects,
deliberately directed against other countries and their nationals.230
But the principle of equality, as it has been developed from the
226
" • • • if they [laws of foreign countries] should be m_anifestly unjust, or calculated to injure their own citizens, they ought to be rejected. Thus, if any State
should enact that its citizens should be discharged from all debts due to creditors living
without the State, such a provision would be so contrary to the common principles of
justice, that the most liberal spirit of comity would not require its adoption in any
other State." Blanchard v. Russell, I 3 Mass. I at 6 ( I 8 I 6). "Every nation .•. should
use its efforts to protect its subjects from foreign laws which are repugnant to its own
interest and policies." Glynn v. United Steel Works Corp., 160 Misc. 405 at 408-409,
289 N. Y. S. 1037 (1935).
227
See supra, note I 20.
228
". • • The Devisen laws are plainly intended to discriminate against nonresident German creditors to the undeserved advantage of resident German debtors .
• . ." Pan-American Securities Corp. v. Fried. Krupp A. G., 169 Misc. 445 at 451,
6 N. Y. S. (2d) 993 (1938). "The German foreign exchange regulations are directed
exclusively against foreign creditors and must by their very nature be directed
exclusively against them . . . • They constitute a conscious and deliberate injury to
foreign creditors for the· benefit of the German economy and the German State."
Swiss Osram case, 39 BuLL. INST. JuR. I I I at 119, 120 (1938). See also (Swiss
Fed. Ct., Oct. 8, 1935) R. 0. 61.Il.242; Weiden, "Foreign Exchange Restrictions,"
16 N. Y. UNiv. L. Q. REv. 559 at 577 (1939). But cf. 52 L. Q. REv. 474 at 475
(1936) and MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MoNEY 263, note I (1938) (misleading).
229
See, e.g., the (old) Devisen law of 1935, § I, par. 4: "The Reichs-Office can
release particular persons either wholly or in part from the restrictions and prohibitions."
23
° Casparius, "Ungeloeste Fragen au£ dem Gebiet der Zivilrechtsfolgen der
Deutschen Devisengesetzgebung," 86 JHERING's JAHRBUECHER 33 at 49 (1936).
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tenets of the American and French revolutions, has a wider scope than
the protection of a country's own nationals. In civilized states only
reasonable classifications are deemed permissible in the enactment and
enforcement of laws. Whether a particular classification is reasonable
can be determined only by its purpose, the policy it is intended to promote, and the relation of the resulting differentiations to those factors
in practice. Undue favor and individual or class privileges, on the
one hand, and hostile d1scrimination or oppressive inequality on the
other, are not to be tolerated.281 Courts administering a system of law
which is based on the principle of equal justice for all may thus refuse,
even when persons other than their own nationals are involved, to
enforce foreign laws which in their view flagrantly violate this fundamental principle.282
Among the marked features of the German law and practice relating to foreign exchange are the favors they bestow on "persons of
German blood," without regard to nationality or domicile. The provisions for "alleviation of har9-ships" ( H aerteausgleich) have this
primary purpose.233 In certain circumstances they permit, for instance,
an Aryan of German blood who desires to immigrate into Germany,
to dispose freely of Sperrmark which he acquired abroad at a fraction
of their face value. In addition, if he brings foreign money with him,
he may receive more in marks than what corresponds to the o:tficial rate.
The legal procedure, as an official circular frankly puts it, "enables an
immigrant to increase his fortune not inconsiderably." 234
In contrast to these are the regulations issued in Germany and the
occupied countries affecting persons who are not regarded as possessed
of rights which the law must respect. There are innumerable discriminatory orders applicable to Czechs, Poles, Jews and others.2 ~5 Inequali2 CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., 802-845 (1927).
"It is believed that the exception [ to the application of a foreign law because
0£ its injustice or detriment to the people of the forum] comprises within its scope
all those for whose protection and benefit the lex fori is enacted, including not only
citizens, but aliens domiciled there, and sometimes persons resident there for a temporary purpose," MINOR, CoNFLICT OF LAWS 17 (1901). See also DICEY, CONFLICT
OF LAws, 4th ed., 30 (1927); Vavoni v. Moineau, (French Cass. Req., Jnly 18, 1859)
SIREY l 8 59.I.822.
283 WILMANNs, Aus- UND EINWANDERUNG 23 (1937).
284 RE 104/36 D. St.; also, e.g., RE 26/39 D. St. (at IIB2b, IIB6b).
285 See Letter of Resignation of James G. McDonald, High Commissioner for
Refugees, Addressed to the Secretary General of the League of Nations, dated Dec. 27,
1933, cited by Collins, J., in Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn Gesellschaft, 159 Misc.
830 at 841,290 N. Y. S. 181 (1936). See also, supra, notes 153, 154, 155.
- 231

282
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ties have been created between various categories of persons even in
respect to their right to present their claims or defenses in court.236
Courts outside of Germany are under no obligation to enforce laws
of this kind. "English courts do not recognize in England any penal
( or privative) status arising under a foreign law, as, for example, the
status of civil death, or civil disabilities or incapacities which may be
imposed on priests, nuns, Jews, Protestants, slaves or others, by the law
of the country to which they may belong...." 287 Shortly before the
collapse of France, the Tribunal de Commerce of Paris, in a case which
turned on property rights in a Czech business concern, declared that
"among the principles doing honor to French law" is "the recognition
of the equality of the rights of citizens, without any discrimination as
to origin, race and religion." 288 The foreign law being inconsistent
with this principle, the court, on the ground of public policy, re:fµsed
to apply it. Earlier the Gour d'Appel of Paris had asserted that
"equality before the law is in France a fundamental legal principle,"
that it would not apply a foreign law imposing, though on a foreigner,
a kind of "civil death" which had been abolished in France, and that
a French court "would not embark on investigations into the racial
origins and religious affiliations of litigants." 289 Swiss courts, too, have
adverted to "violation of equality in the law" as justifying the repudiation of a foreign rule. 240
Violation of the principle of equality and the presence of political,
retroactive or confiscatory features, such as have been already discussed,
have furnished potent arguments which have led courts to refuse to
enforce, directly or indirectly, some foreign exchange regulations which
under the general rules of conflict of laws would have been held controlling. These are not necessarily the only arguments that can be·
advanced. Other aspects of the public policy of the forum may in
286 When in consequence of the decree of Sept. 27, 1938, there were, e.g., no
longer any Jewish attorneys in Germany, the representative of the Fuehrer, Hess,
nevertheless ordered (No. 204/1938) that Nazi attorneys ought to represent Jews
only "where the predominant interest of the German people requires it." According
to traditional principles of free countries, it is "the paramount duty of the court, before
which any suit is brought, to see to it that the parties have had a fair and impartial
trial." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. II3 at 205, 16 S. Ct. 139 (1895).
287 D1cEY, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 4th ed., 30 (1927).
288 Jellinek v. Levy, (Trib. Com. Paris, Jan. 18, 1940) GAZ. PAL. 1940.I.188.
289 Gimpel v. Aronsfrau, (Cour d'App. Paris, Jan. 9, 1939) 34 REV. CRITIQUE
300 (1939).
Ho Thorsch case, (Bezirksgericht Zurich, Dec. 7, 1938) 40 BULL. lNsT. JuR.
251, No. 10702a (1939).
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some instances provide additional arguments that are relevant and
compelling.
The same line of reasoning may be applied to British, South American, Japanese and any other legislation dealing with foreign exchange.
The result will not always be the same; it will vary according to the
character of the legislation.•
Two theories, however, which will now be discussed, seem likely
to impede a satisfactory solution of the problems raised by the doctrine
of public policy.241

VII
IMPEDIMENTS TO THE APPLICATION oF THE TEST OF PuBLIC PoLICY

A. Abuses of the Contact Theory
It is a natural consequence of the relative character of the notion
of public policy that the doctrine based on it should be more readily
applied in cases involving an act which occurred in the court's own
country or which had a definite -effect there than in cases whose only
connection with the forum lies in the fact that the plaintiff was able
there to obtain jurisdiction of the defendant.242 But the contact theory,
which for some time has been gaining ground anew, goes much farther.
As formulated by Professor Nussbaum, it postulates that "Only an
actual, strong and adverse interest of the forum will prompt the court
to refuse ~he application of the foreign law tp.at would govern under
general conflict of laws rules" and that, in the absence of such adverse
interests, even "a foreign law which in itself is repugnant to the forum
should be accorded recognition." 243 "The closeness of the relation between the particular case and the forum" 244 and "the material interest
of the forum" 245 should, according to this theory, be the decisive factors.
241 For an illustration of the confusion to which these theories can give rise, see
comment in l 7 BosT. UNiv. L. REv. 102 ( 1-93 7).
242 Cf. Kosters, "Public Policy in Private International Law," 29 YALE L. J. 745
at 757 (1920); comment, 23 VA. L. REv. 288 at 297 (1937).
243 Nussbaum, "Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws,"
49 YALE L. J. 1027 at 1030 (1940). See also NussBAUM, MoNEY IN THE LAW 490
(1939); Husserl, "Public Policy and Ordre Public," 25 VA. L. REV. 37 at 66 (1938).
244 Comment in 45 YALE L. J. 1463 at 1470 (1936).
,
245 Klein, comment in 17 BosT. Umv. L. REv. 102 at 129 (1937). NussBAUM,
MONEY IN THE LAw 496 (1939), stating, "There must be a material contact of the
case with the forum to warrant the use of the public policy weapon." Nussbaum,
"Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws," 49 YALE L. J. 1027
at 1050 (1940), stating, "any mentionable economic interest of the forum will suffice."
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Adherents to this theory ass~rt that it is firmly established, especially in the United States. It is submitted, however, that the authorities cited do not support this contention.246 We see the Supreme
Court of the United States stressing, as early as 1880, that a right
2

¾<1 The fact that courts frequently allude to the contacts involved is not in itself
conclusive. See supra, at note 242. A few of the American cases which respect an
objectionable foreign law can perhaps be regarded as based, at least in part, on the
contact theory. See, e.g., Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn Gesellschaft, l 59 Misc. 830,
290 N.Y.S. 181 (1936), modified 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E. (2d) 798 (1938). Other
American decisions are wholly inconsistent with the contact theory. See, e.g., cases
cited in notes 247, 248, 249, infra. Many of the authorities cited for the theory are
simply not in point. None of those relied on in 45 YALE L. J. 1463 at 1470, note
28 (1936) is even concerned with any question of contacts: Strauss & Co. v. Canadian
Pacific R.R., 254 N. Y. 407, 173 N.E. 564 (1930); CoNFJ,ICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT, Nm~ YoRK ANNOTATIONS 388 (1935); 33 CoL. L. REv. 750 at 751 (1933).
See also 45 YALE L. J. 1463 at 1470, notes 29, 30 (1936); Nussbaum, "Public Policy
and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws," 49 YALE L. J. 1027 at 1030-1031,
notes 23, 25 (1940). Among the authorities cited by the Yale comment, note 30, is
Kosters, "Public Policy in Private International Law," 29 YALE L. J. 745 at 757-758
( 1920). But Professor Kosters, in the very article cited, speaks, at p. 764, of cases
which should be governed by the doctrine of public policy even though "no material
interests of the state or society of the judge's country are injured," and, at p. 758,
states that "The provisions of the foreign law undoubtedly turn the scale in many
cases, independent of the points of connection.••."
With respect to European law, and particularly German law, NussBAUM,
DEUTSCHES lNTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT (1932), remarks that "the point is
much disputed" (p. 64, note 2) and cites (p. 65, note 4) judgments of the Supreme
Court of Germany and other German courts which are rather at variance with the
contact theory. No persuasive authorities affording support for the contact theory have
been cited from countries other than Germany. For cases involving foreign exchange
legislation which are wholly inconsistent with the contact theory, see, e.g. Jansen,
van den Oever & Cie. v. Maiani, (Trib. Civ. Zurich, Apr. 23, 1937) 1938 BLAETTER
FUER ZuERCHERISCHE RECHTSPRECHUNG 225, 4 Nouv. REv. 627 (1937); Bronstein v. Banque Russo-Asiatique, (Cour d'App. Paris, June 30, 1933) 60 CLUNET
963 (1933); Zenith v. Baer, Sondheimer & Co., (Civ. Ct. Oslo, Feb. 13, 1936)
SJOEFARTSTIDENDE, Feb. 19, 1936 (Norway). Professor Nussbaum, supra, 49 YALE
L. J. at 1032, recognizes that "it is not inconsistent with the relativity doctrine to
hold certain foreign rules so repugnant to the policy of the forum that no recognition
should be given to them regardless of contacts." See, to the same effect, id. at 1030.
Similarly, in his DEUTSCHES lNTERNATIONALES PRIVATR.ECHT 64 (1932), Professor
Nussbaum remarked: "Such an application of foreign rules as would, according to our
standards, be against good morals is to be absolutely rejected. Basic considerat.ions may
in other cases, too, make it necessary to enforce certain substantive rules." And he
refers, ibid., by way of illustration, to gambling cases where, he states, legal prohibitions of the forum should be considered "inalienable." Gambling, however, is generally regarded as a matter of minor morals. Why, then, should human enslavement
or other monstrous measures meet with greater lenity? Where is a line of demarcation
to be drawn? And what remains of the contact theory if the reservations made by
Professor Nussbaum are to be taken at their face value?
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vested abroad, if of obnoxious origin; will not be enforced in the courts
of the United States,247 "not from any consideration of the interests of
that government or any regard for. its policy, but from the inherent
viciousness of the transaction, its repugnance to our morality and the
pernicious effect which its enforcement by our courts would have upon
our people." That a cause "against good morals or natural justice ..•
would be prejudicial to the general interests of ... citizens," 248 has
been repeatedly reaffirmed by the courts.249 A departure from these
clearly stated views would seem possible, only if the courts had lowered their standards of good morals and natural justice. Until the
contrary is proved, it should not be assumed that "To let oneself slide
down the easy slope offered by the course of events and to dull one's
mind against the extent of the danger" involved 250 will be the rule of
conduct the American courts will follow.
Naturally, certain contacts between the subject matter and the
forum must exist in order that the court may be enabled to take jurisdiction. Also, the doctrine of forum non conveniens enables the courts
to refuse to exercise jurisdiction if they feel strongly that complete
justice cannot be administered in the forum or that the suit can be more
equitably and conveniently disposed of in another jurisdiction. It is,
however, a characteristic of courts of high repute everywhere, that,
once they take up a cause on the merits, they act only on the basis of
equal rights for all. It is an instance of this principle that, in the courts
of the United States, aliens are, on the whole, entitled to the same
protection as citizens.251 But, under the contact theory a judge, in some
247 Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 at 277 (1880). DICEY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS, 4th ed., 29-30 (1927) states: "English courts refuse to give legal effect to
transactions, wherever taking place, which our tribunals hold to be immoral. Thus
. . . an agreement which, though innocent in itself, is intended by the parties to
promote an immoral purpose, or, a promise obtained through what our courts consider
duress or coercion, is according to English Jaw based on an immoral consideration.
Such a promise or agreement, therefore, even were it valid in the country where it
was made, will not be enforced by English judges."
248 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Day, 79 Wash. 499 at 503, 140 P. 681 (1914), quot. ing Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. R., 31 Minn. II at 15 (1883); Skillman v.
Conner, 8 Harr. (38 Del.) 402, 193 A. 563 (1937), and cases therein cited.
249 Cf. also Fox v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 138 Wis. 648, 120 N. W. 399
(1909); Folsom v. Continental Adjustment Corp., 48 Ga. App. 435, 172 S. E. 833
(1933); Nussbaum, "Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws,"
49 YALE L. J. 1027 a't 1032, note 36 (1940); comment in 38 CoL. L. REv. 1490,
note 17 (1938); CHEATHAM, DowLING, AND GooDRICH, CAsEs AND OTHER MATERIALS oN CoNFLICT OF LAws, 1st ed,, 499, note 1 (1936).
250 McReynolds, J., dissenting in Perry v. United States (Gold Clause cases), 294
U. S. 330 at 362, 55 S. Ct. 432 (1935).
251 "These provisions [ of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu~ion] are
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circumstances, would- have to make different decisions on the same set
of facts depending on how closely the parties are connected with the
forum. 252 If the required contacts are absent, the theory would expect
a judge to do no less than enforce foreign laws or uphold legal situations, even where they are plainly contrary to his notions of honesty
and decency. 258 "This is no longer mere positivism but amounts to
legal materialism." 254
Recent experiences have clearly shown, even in the field of international relations, to what extent the results of a one-sided concern
with mere utility and expediency may turn against the intentions of its
universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection
of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 at 369, 6 S. Ct. 1064 (1886); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 7 (1915);
Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481 at 491, 5 I S. Ct. 229 (1930);
Hibernia National Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367 at 385 (1881); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 at 65, 61 S. Ct. 399 (1940).
252 Cf. Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn Gesellschaft, 159 Misc. 830, 290 N. Y. S.
181 (1936), modified 277 N. Y. 474, 14 N. E. (2d) 798 (1938). The German
Railways Corporation, in 1932, employed the plaintiff for three years as one of its
directors, it being stipulated in the contract that if he became unable to perform his
duties he should receive a certain indemnity. He was dismissed in 1933 under the
so-called Aryan laws and, without being charged with any offense, was placed in a
concentration camp. He later came to New York and there brought an action against
the German corporation, alleging two causes of action, one for damages for breach
of contract and the other for compensation under the contract. The case is discussed
in 38 CoL. L. REv. 1490 (1938); 17 BosT. UNiv. L. REv. 102 (1937); 23 VA. L.
REv. 288 (1937); 24 VA. L. REv. 922 (1938); 45 YALE L. J. 1463 (1936); 47
YALE L. J. 451 at 458 (1938).
258 "Morally, the plaintiff should undoubtedly recover, but ••• the courts should
not allow moral notions, aided by an intense current feeling against the Nazi regime,
to lead them to a conclusion which will plague them later, when feeling does not
run so high." Comment on Holzer case in 23 VA. L. REV. 288 at 297 (1937).
"Since the action is between German nationals on a contract performable in Germany,
the so-called Devisen Laws of that country must be held to apply 'however objectionable' we may consider them." Branderbit v. Hamburg-American Line, 31 N. Y. S.
(2d) 588 (Sup. Ct. 1941), citing Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn Gesellschaft, 277
N. Y. 474, 14 N. E. (2d) 798 (1938). But cf. supra, note 24.
2 54, RIPERT, LA REGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES 392 (1925).
" ••• when, as happens from time to time, the law itself presents a choice, and when it
is a question whether one or other principle is to be applied, then it seems to me that
it is impossible, as it is undesirable, that the decision should not have regard to the
ethical motive of promoting justice." MACMILLAN, LAW & OTHER THINGS 49 (1937).
"It was one of the greatest masters of our law, Lord MacNaghten, who said: "It is
public scandal when the law is forced to uphold a dishonest act." Id. 48. "Our civil
laws must be interpreted as being based on the general principles of Christian morality,
and must be deemed made to govern a Christian civilization." Sutherland v. Gariepy,
II REVUE DE JURISPRUDENCE (Quebec) 314 (1904), cited by l JoHNSoN, CoNFLICT
OF LAws 187 (1933).

a
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authors. Quite apart from this, moreover, one may expect with confidence that, in a country where zeal for economic achievement does not
exclude regard for religious and moral values, the axiom jus est ars
aequi et bani will not become a dead letter, to be found only inscribed
on the portals of law schools. Certainly, the law has not a religious
or a moral, but primarily a social, purpose. A law that fails to promote
morality is not necessarily bad. But, and this is the point, a law that
promoted immorality would be a bad law.255 If wholesome conditions
are to be preserved, such laws must be unreservedly banned.
Professor Thomas H. Healy, in his compr~hensive lectures at The
Hague on the "Theorie Generale de l'Ordre Public," completely disregarded the contact theory.256 Unfortunate excesses of this theory
should be checked before it is adopted on a wide scale by the American
courts.

B. Supposed Consequences of Recognition or Nonrecognition of a
Foreign Government
The other doctrine requiring mention at this point is one which
relates the subject of this paper to public international law.
In the lower Anglo-American courts and even in some of the
higher courts, it became almost a ritual to remark that laws of an unrecognized government cannot be given e:ffect.257 A number of courts
have thus for years referred to the nonrecognition of the Soviet government as the reason why, in many important litigations, they had to
refuse to enforce the revolutionary Russian decrees. 258
Nonrecognition of another country's government is, however, not
a compelling reason for a refusal to enforce its law.
"A distinction may clearly be drawn between (I) the status
of an unrecognized government in a municipal court and the
power of a municipal court to deal with situations arising out of
the de facto existence of the unrecognized government, and ( 2)
the status of an unrecognizep. government under international
law.... a judgment by the court upon the first point [ does not
commit] the court to a decision upon the second." 259
255
256

257

1 BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAws 43-44 (1935).
9 RECUEIL CouRs 1925.IV.411.

Borchard, "The Unrecognized Government in American Courts," 26 AM. J.
INT. L. 261 at 268 (1932).
258
HunsoN, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 102-177 (1929); Dickinson, "Recognition Cases, 1925-1930," 25 AM. J. INT. L. 214 (1931).
259 Jones, "The Retroactive Effect of the Recognition of States and Governments," 16 BRITISH YEAR BooK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 at 49-50 (1935).

1 943]

FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS

1113

Foreign facts cannot always be ignored solely because they had
their origin in the act of an unrecognized government.260 Professor
Borchard and other eminent writers have thus suggested that it would
have been better if the courts had based their decisions in these cases
primarily on domestic public policy.261
After the Soviet government had been recognized, a change took
place in the attitude of many courts. Solely because of the recognition,
Soviet laws were now accorded different treatment even in the field
of private international law. Some courts followed the line of thought
that to disregard the laws of a recognized government might vex it
or that it "might well with a susceptible foreign government become
a casus belli." 262 It was also asserted that the political recognition of
a foreign government necessarily, to quote the language used by Justice
Clarke, "validates all the actions and conduct of the government so
recognized from the commencement of its existence." 263 Similar arguments are advanced, in actions involving foreign exchange regulations,
in advocacy of the enforcement of the regulations as a corollary of the
recognition of the foreign government.
Apprehension of offending a foreign government, which in any
event could be rarely justified in the case of a court of justice, cannot
be accorded much weight, since the court, when it refers to the principle
of public policy, need not say more than that the foreign rule appears
inconsistent with domestic institutions. There is, in this, no expression
of censure.
On the other hand, the recognition of a foreign government, as
26 ° Cf., e.g., Salimoff v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N. Y. 220, 186 N. E. 679
(1933); Dickinson, "The Unrecognized Government or State in English and American Law," 22 M1cH. L. REv. 29, II8 (1923); Connick, "The Effect of Soviet
Decrees in American Courts," 34 YALE L. J. 499 (1925); Fraenkel, "The Juristic
Status of Foreign States, Their Property and Their Acts," 25 CoL. L. REV. 544 (1925).
261 Borchard, "The Unrecognized Government in American Courts," 26 AM. J.
INT. L. 261 (1932); JAFFE, JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1933);
Brown, "La Reconnaissance des Nouveaux Etats et des Nouveaux Gouvernements,"
59 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION CoMPAREE 5 (1932);
KNAPP, LA NoTioN DE L'ORDRE PuBLIC DANS LEs CoNFLITS DE Lois 14 (1933).
262 Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 3 K.B. 532 at 559. At 558, the court had stated:
" ••• it appears a serious breach of international comity, if a state is recognized as a
sovereign independent state, to postulate that its legislation is 'contrary to essential
principles of justice and morality.'"
263 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 at 303, 38 S. Ct. 309 (1918);
Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 38 S. Ct. 312 (1918); United States
v. President and Directors of Manhattan Co., 276 N. Y. 396 at 405, 12 N. E. (2d)
518 (1938).
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Professor John Bassett Moore puts it, "validates nothing." 264 Professor Philip C. Jessup characterizes as "unfortunate" the dictum which
has been quoted from Justice Clarke.265 The recognition may imply
that from now on the foreign laws will have to be regarded as duly
enacted laws and not as acts of usurpers or of some kind of lawless
bodies. But the act of recognition should not imply approval of the
country's laws, much less assure them extraterritorial effect in renunciation of the traditional check exercised by domestic public policy.
Could it possibly be argued that this check should be renounced even
in favor of the laws of barbarous powers, more barbarous perhaps than
for instance the Barbary pirates, merely because the United States had
established diplomatic relations and concluded treaties with them? 266
Public policy as an exclusionary device was developed in all countries with reference to perfectly regular and internationally recognized
foreign enactments. This would not have been possible if the views _
here discussed had then prevailed.
Authoritative statements that "diplomatic recognition does not
compel our courts to give effect to foreign laws if they are contrary
to our public policy" can, of course, be found. 267 But in recent years
the courts have been to an increasing degree led astray "by the mistaken theory that the validity of the acts or laws of a foreign government and the extent to which extraterritorial effect must be accorded
to those acts or laws, depend on political recognition." 268 It is, therefore, highly desirable that, particularly in actions which turn on foreign
exchange regulations and analogous matters, the question of the recognition of the foreign government should be eliminated from consideration as an element which may inhibit the courts from focusing their
attention on public policy.
264

Moore, "Fifty Years of International Law," 50 HARV. L. REv. 395 at 431

(1937).
Jessup, "The Litvinoff Assignment and the Belmont Case," 31 AM. J. INT. L.
481 at 482 (1937).
·
266 One of the treaties, the treaty with Tripoli, "declared that, as the government of the United States was 'not in any sense founded on the Christian Religion'
and had 'in itself no character of enmity against the laws, religion, or tranquillity of
Mussulmen,' no pretext arising from religious opinions should ever produce an interruption of the harmony existing between the two countries." MooRE, CANDOR AND
COMMON SENSE 28 (1930).
267 Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 266 N. Y. 71 at 90, 193 N. E. 897
(1934). See also Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 189
N. E. 456 (1934); James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 239 N. Y. 248, 146 N. E.
369 (1925) •
.253 Borchard, "The Unrecognized Government in American Courts," 26 AM. J.
INT. L. 261 at 264 (1932). ,
265
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VIII
AMERICAN AND OTHER APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM

The test of public policy in the field of conflict of laws has been
applied more commonly in civil law countries than in the United States.
Under the American rules governing conflicts, cases are decided with
reference to foreign law less frequently than elsewhere, and there is,
consequently, less occasion for determining whether a foreign law
should be rejected as incompatible with the public policy of the forum.
Moreover, when under the American rules a foreign law is relevant, the American courts have, more than other courts, regarded this
test with doubt or have even wholly rejected it.269
One of the principal reasons for this attitude is that the American
rules have been developed largely in cases involving conflicts between
the laws of the several states of the Union. Because of the common
heritage and development and the close relation and connection of the
American family of states, such inconsistencies in law as· arise are for
the most part limited to questions of "minor morals of expediency." 210
This, of course, explains why Professor Goodrich would "cast out altogether" public policy in the area of interstate conflicts. 211
Weighty influence may be attributed also to the liberal traditions
of the United States. 212 One likes to assume that, by and large, men
everywhere are governed by the same canons of logic and ethics, and
that it is highly advisable to recognize and enforce the laws enacted
by other countries within the scope of their sovereign power and the
269 Nussbaum, "Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws,"
49 YALE L. J. 1027 at 1029 (1940).
'
270 Phrase from opinion of Crouch, J., dissenting, in Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y.
466 at 475, 3 N. E. (2d) 597 (1936).
271
Goodrich, "Foreign Facts and Local Fancies," 25 VA. L. REV. 26 at 35
(1938). "To refuse local effect to a foreign claim when the claimed right arises in a
foreign country is unfortunate. As among the States of our Union it is absurd."
Goodrich, "Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts," 36 W. VA. L. Q. 156 at 170
(1936). Beach, "Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights," 27 YALE L. J.
656 at 662 (1918), calls the application of public policy as between states of the
United States "'an intolerable affectation of superior value." Cf. Stumberg, "Conflict
of Laws, Foreign Created Rights," 8 TEX. L. REv. 173 (1930); STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CoNFLICT OF LAWS 152 (1939); Heilman, "Judicial Method and Economic Objectives in Conflict of Laws," 43 YALE L. J. 1082 (1934); Dodd, "The
Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of
Laws," 39 HARV. L. REv. 533 at 557-560 (1926); Du Bois, "The Significance in
Conflict of Laws of the Distinction between Interstate and International Transactions,"
17 MrNN. L. REv. 361 (1933).
272
Nussbaum, "Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws,"
49 YALE L. J. 1027 at 1048 (1940).
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rights created by such laws. 278 This is a pendant to what liberalism
taught in the economic field. "Harmony, liberal intercourse with all
nations, are recommended by policy, humanity and interest." 274
Unhappily, however, the assumptions on which this theory is
premised 275 are today not always borne out by facts. 276 Political action
in some countries, as they have themselves formulated it, "is nothing
else nor can it be anything but the promotion of the vital interests of
the people and the effective prosecution of its life struggle by every
means." 211 Foreign exchange legislation, in particular, has often been
merely an instrument of aggressive activities. 218 Juristic publications
are advertised as "noiselessly exploding mines." 279 It is a struggle for
power and no longer, to use Jhering's words, a struggle for law.
273 " • • • the willingness of one state to give effect to rights gained under the
laws of other states depends upon the existence of a similarity in principle between
the legal and moral notions prevailing among different communities." DICEY, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 4th -ed., 25 (1927). To the same effect see, e.g., I BARTIN, PRIN- CIPES DE DRoIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 68 (1930). "The similarity ..• between
the moral principles prevailing in all civilized countries is now. so great that the instances are of necessity rare in which English tribunals can be asked to treat as immoral
transactions which in a foreign country give rise to legal rights." D1cEY, supra, 30.
274 Washington's Farewell Address.
275 " • • • there must be full and peaceful intercourse between the people of these
different states." Goodrich, "Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts," 36 W. VA. L. Q.
156 at 158 (1936).
276 The following observation appears today more than ever of importance.
" •.. there are nations ... whose views and ways are.so different from ours that we
could not establish at all between them and us a system of private international law,
by which effect might as a general rule be given in Christian states to their laws
and judgments.•.." WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw, 5th ed., 55 (1912).
277 Seeger, "Das Devisenrecht als Werkzeug der Devisenpolitik," 1937 DEv.
ARCH. 245 at 273, 278 (with reference to a speech of Hitler).
278 See supra, at note 178. Those who advocate the recognition of certain exchange restrictions often assert that there can be no postulate of unlimited freedom in
the sense that individuals should be allowed to dispose freely of their goods according
to their fancies. E.g., Ettore Conti, Milano, and Filippo Carli, Pisa, in the 1937
, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF CoMMERCE. Exchange regulations, it is insisted, were designed as a "piece of organized thriftiness with the
resources of the national economy," Schirmacher, "Devisenrecht-ein Notrecht?"
193 7 DEv. ARCH. 8 57 at 926, 93 3; to keep the national economy healthy as a part
of the world economy, and "without hostile intent," Dietrich, "Zur Geltung nationalen
Rechts im international~n Rechtsverkehr," 67 JuR. WocH. 2606 (1938); with a view
to preparing a new order of international relations to be F,rected "on the basis of
mutual respect and helpfulness," Schirmacher, supra at 936. But this series of
attractive arguments quite disregarded the actual state of affairs.
279
The publisher's prospectus of Prof. Carl Schmitt's IM KAMPF MIT WEIMARGENF-VERSAILLES, 1923-1939.
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Liberties and privileges accorded by other systems are used primarily
280
in order the m~re easily to displace and supersede these systems.
The wisdom of thousands of years, which had been all but forgotten in this technical age, is being recognized anew. No constitution
or legal formula can alone, and without the effort and good will of
individuals, secure progress, justice and utility in internal or international relations. The :world is eternally an arena for the struggle of
conflicting human passions, of good and evil, of right and wrong.
As early as the fourteenth century, in the writings of the great
Italian jurist Bartolus,281 who was one of the first to deal with the
concept of conflict of laws, we find a distinction drawn between statuta
odiosa and statuta f avorabilia.
American judges, approaching problems in a far less dogmatic
spirit than jurists in civil-law countries, are wont to adjust the law
continuously to the exigencies and changes of society. It would thus
be only natural if, in these days of martial, political and social upheaval, they inquired more closely than before whether a foreign law
bears evidence of being unjust, shocking, dictated by a predatory purpose or, in general, contrary to the interests and basic principles of the
nation whose courts are asked to enforce it. This would, indeed, be but
a logical and wholesome return to the doctrine of territoriality, which
has always been the basic theory of the American law of conflicts. 282
A final observation may be added. The aspects of public policy
which have been discussed in this paper are those which have made
possible the rise and growth of present-day private international law.
Powerful states, groups and individuals, encouraged in part by shortcomings of the democracies, have challenged the principles that have
been developed and have demanded that some or all of them be revised
or wholly abandoned. What is remarkable is that the abandonment
of the principles here assumed as basic would not necessarily result in
a greater readiness to enforce foreign exchange restrictions of other
countries. A glance at totalitarian nations will suffice to demonstrate
that the contrary is the case.
280
" • • • the problem to be solved is the measure of recognition that is due under
a given legal system to the acts of another system that professes to displace and to
supersede it." Cardozo, C. J., in Petrogradsky M. K. Bank v. National City Bank,
253 N. Y. 23 at 35, 170 N. E. 479 (1930).
281
Bartolus de Saxoferrato ( I 314-13 57), "the most imposing figure among the
lawyers of the middle ages." BARTOLUS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws, transl. Beale, 9
(1914).
282
For a continental appreciation of this American theory, see Professor Niboyet's
preface to the French translation of the AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW OF, CONFLICT OF LAWS viii (1937).
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Totalitarian governments are not concerned with the maintenance
of traditional legal principles.283 For determining whether a foreign
law should be recognized, as well as for other matters, they have
adopted the Nietzschean maxim, "What's good for me, that's what I
call justice." Accordingly, since they ordinarily can, of course, derive
no advantage from.the foreign exchange regulations of other countries,
they take the position, simply on this ground and without regard for
any general principle of justice, that these are not to be respected.
The last accessible German text book on private internatio'n.al law, in
a special chapter on the implications of exchange control, clearly sets
forth this view.284
·
•
Hungarian exchange restrictions which prevented a Hungarian
from discharging a mortgage on property which he owned in Germany
were held, by the highest court of Prussia, not to relieve him of the
consequences of his default. 285 And the German courts have, in general,
refused to give effect to exchange regulations of other countries.
In the same way, the Italian Court of Cassation affirmed a decree
for the foreclosu~e of a mortgage on land in Italy, although the owners of the land, domiciled in allied Germany, had been prevented only
by the German transfer restrictions, which are similar to those of Italy
itself, from paying the mortgage:286
The approaches differ but the result is largely the same, namely,
disregard of a considerable part of the foreign exchange restrictions of
other countries. ·
It is only in a repentant world of the future that the basis can be
created for better and more sincere international cooperation which
may come closer to what Chief Justice Stone has spoken of as "the
most sacred aspiration 9f mankind, the aspiration for the realization
of justice on earth."
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